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Abstract
This paper presents evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese firm-product
data that, given productivity, input tariff reductions induce an incumbent im-
porter/exporter to increase product markups. We further investigate empirical-
ly the mechanisms underlying this trade liberalization effect, and find that input
tariff reductions decrease marginal costs, and their effects on markup adjustments
are more profound among firms with higher import dependence. Moreover, we ex-
ploit unique features of Chinese data by comparing results for two trade regimes:
ordinary trade (wherein firms pay import tariffs to import) and processing trade
(wherein firms are not subject to import tariffs). While the aforementioned trade
liberalization effects and mechanisms only apply to ordinary trade, processing trade
samples are used in a placebo test. The paper also shows that more productive
firms charge higher markups for products. All these findings are robust to alterna-
tive markup measures including one estimate using physical-quantity output data,
different production function specifications, a subsample consisting only of pure
exporters, and estimations based on our theoretical derivations.
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1 Introduction
Globalization has been one of the centers of economic research. It is usually characterized
by openness to final foreign goods and the accompanying competition effect. However,
transactions of intermediate inputs have become increasingly important in global trade
(see Johnson and Noguera, 2012; Koopman, Wang and Wei, 2014). This trend now
prompts economists to switch their attention to input trade liberalization (e.g., Amiti
and Konings, 2007; Bas, 2012).
A typical trade model would assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
function due to its tractability. One implication of this type of model is that firms charge
a constant markup on their products. However, this implication is unsatisfactory since,
as shown by Simonovska (2015), variable markup is the main reason why export prices
respond to variations in a destination country’s income. Policy makers would be interested
to know the degree of market competitiveness, indicated by changes in markups, when
they analyze merger and acquisition proposals or design industry competition policies. A
welfare evaluation analysis would also involve understanding the distribution of markups
(Edmond, Midrigan and Xu, 2015).
This paper contributes to the literature by examining whether lower tariffs on import-
ed intermediates can cause firms to adjust firm-product markups for exported goods, and
by determining the direction and size of such adjustments.1 To meet the requirements
upon accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December of 2001, China
has significantly decreased its tariffs imposed on imported goods; in particular, the aver-
age input tariff dropped by approximately 40% from 2000 to 2006. Meanwhile, Chinese
export tariffs did not change much after joining the WTO, as China has long enjoyed
most-favored-nation treatment from its major trading partners. This difference results in
arguably unilateral trade liberalization in China (Fan, Li and Yeaple, 2015), which serves
as a quasi-natural trade reform for estimating the effect of import tariff reductions on
firms’ market powers.
The use of Chinese data is also advantageous given its distinction between two trade
regimes: ordinary trade (wherein firms pay import tariffs to import) and processing
trade (wherein firms are not subject to import tariffs). More than 50% of transactions
carried out in Chinese trade involve processing trade mechanisms, thus uniquely enabling
us to identify the specific effect of trade liberalization (via input tariff reductions) on
firms’ markup adjustments. When we examine the input-tariff effects on ordinary firms’
markups, processing trade observations may be used as a placebo sample since such
1In robustness checks, we also study the responses of firm-level markups, which measure firm compet-
itiveness in both domestic and foreign markets. Nevertheless, our focus in this paper is on firm-product
markup since highly disaggregate data on the firm-product level allows us to clearly distinguish between
two different trade regimes.
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effects are supposed to be absent for processing trade firms who are exempt from import
tariffs. To be consistent with the firm-product transaction-level customs dataset that
distinguishes between ordinary and processing trade regimes, we match production data
with customs data and use the merged sample to estimate firm-product markups following
an augmented approach by De Loecker et al. (2016).2
To begin with, we document two stylized facts regarding the relationship between
China’s trade liberalization upon WTO accession and firm-product markup adjustments
by incumbent Chinese exporters. Specifically, we find that (1) China’s trade liberalization
is largely driven by firms’ improved access to imported intermediate inputs, and (2)
ordinary trade firms raise their markup levels in response to input tariff reductions, while
processing trade firms do not.
We then substantiate these patterns in a simple model with heterogeneous firms and
variable markups. The prediction is that, when productivity is controlled for, a reduction
in import tariffs enables an ordinary trade firm to become more efficient by making
cheaper and superior inputs accessible to them. Furthermore, the theory predicts that a
more efficient ordinary trade firm charges higher markups. However, these results do not
apply to processing trade, a typical practice that pays no import tariffs in China. Hence,
a processing trade firm would not enjoy a similar reduction in marginal costs.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, a comprehensive empirical analysis con-
firms that ordinary trade observations significantly respond to tariff reductions by in-
creasing their markups while processing trade observations do not. Next, we explore the
validity of marginal cost effects and import dependence levels as the underlying mecha-
nisms in our theoretical model, and analyze the effect of input tariff reductions on export
movements. Our empirical results are robust to various estimation specifications and
different markup measures at both firm-product and firm level. More precisely, we val-
idate our empirical results with markup measures that rely on an alternative form of
production function, a pool of pure exporters, and an estimation procedure derived from
our own model that requires only observable market shares and substitution elasticities.
In addition, to show that our empirical results are robust to both revenue-based and
quantity-based production function estimates, we employ a new dataset obtained from
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) that contains information on the
physical quantities of our sample firms’ output.
This paper is related to a growing literature on how trade liberalization can lead
2The firm-level production dataset does not make a distinction between processing trade and ordinary
trade. However, the firm-product customs dataset is rich enough to provide trade regime information
at the transaction level. If we define processing or ordinary trade at the firm level, then more than
40% of firms are hybrids that conduct both processing and ordinary trade transactions. Therefore, it is
preferable to use firm-product markup instead of firm markup in the context of differentiating between
processing and ordinary trade regimes.
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to efficient allocation of resources among firms (e.g., De Loecker et al., 2016; Arkolakis
et al., 2015). As noted in De Loecker et al. (2016), many previous studies in this field
have only examined the competitive effects caused by output tariff reductions, whereas
the implications of input tariff reductions have attracted less effort.
Our paper is complementary to previous research that analyzed the impact of trade
liberalization on firms’ market powers. In contrast to their focus on the developed world
(Chen, Imbs and Scott, 2009; Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski, 2001), we direct our
attention towards emerging markets and developing countries. Although we are not the
first to make these cases, for example, Harrison, 1994 examined the case of Côte d’Ivoire,
Levinsohn, 1993 the case of Turkey, and De Loecker et al. (2016) the case of India, we differ
from their studies in approaching the issue through a rather unique feature of Chinese
data: the presence of the processing trade regime as the control group in identifying the
operation mechanism of tariff reductions.
Our paper is also complementary to a large body of literature that emphasizes the role
of accessibility to imported intermediates in improving firm performance. This research
group considers positive markup adjustment as one novel dimension of firm response to
achieve superior performance.3
Finally, we indirectly contribute to an ongoing discussion of transforming policy to
welfare outcomes. Since our findings suggest that more import dependent firms set higher
markups during input market liberalization, there would be an adjustment of markup
distribution across the industry. In a recent paper, Edmond, Midrigan and Xu, 2015
concludes that the distribution of markup is an important determinant of social welfare.
Therefore, our paper links a particular type of trade policy to welfare implications. We
also contribute to a nascent literature that explores the difference between ordinary and
processing trade firms’ behaviors (see Yu, 2015; Manova and Yu, forthcoming).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents two stylized facts
regarding trade liberalization and markup adjustment. Section 3 presents a simplified
theory to examine the impact of tariff reductions on firms’ markups. Section 4 describes
the identification strategy, datasets, and measurements used, as well as the estimation
method for firm-product markups. Section 5 presents our econometric specifications and
reports the main results, followed by an interpretation of the underlying mechanisms.
Section 6 conducts a variety of robustness checks, and the final section is the conclusion.
3Traditional dimensions of superior firm performance include improved total factor productivity (e.g.,
Amiti and Konings, 2007; Yu, 2015; Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2015; Gopinath and Neiman, 2014),
quality upgrading (e.g., Amiti and Khandelwal, 2013; Fan, Li and Yeaple, 2015; Fan, Li and Yeaple,
2016; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015), and expanded product scope (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2010).
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2 Stylized facts
This section documents two stylized facts concerning the relationship between China’s
trade liberalization and Chinese exporting firms’ markup. The method used to estimate
firm-product markups is described in great detail in Section 4. Note that we categorize
goods under the HS6 product classification.






2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total import value Intermediate inputs
Capital goods Consumption goods
Notes: Import values are computed for the entire Customs dataset. This figure does not distinguish between ordinary
trade and processing trade. The illustration for ordinary trade alone displays a similar pattern and is available upon
request.
It is widely recognized that China has carried out substantial liberalization reform
since joining the WTO in 2001, and trade openness has significantly affected its final
and intermediate goods markets. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
classification, we use the entire universe of the Chinese customs database to plot a bar
chart for both aggregate and component (capital goods, intermediate goods, and final
consumption goods) values of Chinese imports in Figure 1. As can been seen from the
Figure, aggregate imports by Chinese firms have more than tripled from 0.21 trillion U.S.
dollars in 2000 to 0.72 trillion U.S. dollars in 2006. More importantly, the majority of
Chinese imports are intermediate (74%) and capital goods (19%). Imported final goods
only account for 4% of total imports and this small share has remained fairly stable
overtime.4 This determines our first stylized fact:
4A fourth “uncertain” category represents the remaining 3% of total import value.
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Stylized fact 1. Trade liberalization in China since its accession to the WTO has largely
been driven by improved access to imported intermediate inputs.
Figure 1 presents evidence that much of the rise in total imports stems from a surge
in intermediate and capital goods, both of which can be broadly referred to as inputs. As
a result, China serves as an appropriate research object to examine the impacts of trade
liberalization (in the form of input tariff reductions) on firms’ market powers (for which
we use markups to proxy).
To visualize changes in Chinese firms’ market powers, we first estimate firm-product
markups using a version of De Loecker et al. (2016)’s methodology that is slightly modified
to accommodate unique characteristics of the Chinese data. This method was designed to
examine multi-product firms’ pricing strategies, so it has the flexibility to assign different
markups to different products. Before moving to the next step, we have to mention
that the markup estimation uses a sample of manufacturing firms derived from merging
production data with customs data (see Section 4 for a detailed description).
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Input tariff change
Processing Trade
Notes: The dashed lines represent fitted values from regressing changes in firm-product markups on input tariff changes.
The shaded areas represent associated confidence intervals. The amount of variable changes equals to that variable’s
value in 2006 minus its value in 2000.
Input tariffs are calculated by combining product-level output tariffs and China’s
input-output (IO) table (see Section 4 for the computation process). We then regress
change in markup estimates between the years 2000 and 2006 on change in input tariffs
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over the same period, and plot in Figure 2 the predicted markup adjustments within a
90% confidence interval against input tariff cuts for each of the two trade regimes. We
find that the size of tariff effects on markup adjustments depends on whether the ordinary
or processing trade regime is considered. For ordinary trade firms, input tariff reductions
increase their markups significantly (i.e., firms facing larger cuts in tariffs raise markups
to higher degrees); for processing trade firms, this relationship is much less pronounced.
This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that processing trade firms are exempt
from input tariffs, and can only enjoy an indirect benefit if they cooperate with ordinary
trade suppliers domestically. We thus summarize the second stylized fact as follows:
Stylized fact 2. In response to input tariff reductions during trade liberalization, an
ordinary trade firm raises its markups to a large extent, while a processing trade firm
does not make such significant adjustments.
3 A simple model
In this section, we present a bare-bones, partial equilibrium model of trade with het-
erogeneous firms. The aim is to provide a theoretical explanation of how import tariff
reductions can induce incumbent import/export firms to adjust their markups as well as
marginal costs. In the model, for each domestic firm, final goods production involves an
intermediate inputs bundle that contains both domestically supplied and foreign-imported
intermediate inputs.
3.1 Consumers
The preference of a representative consumer is given by a CES utility function defined








where x (ω) is the quantity demanded for good ω. All goods are substitutes for each
other with an elasticity of substitution σ > 1. The representative consumer’s optimization





where p (ω) is the unit price of good ω, P =
[∑
ωp (ω)
1−σ] 11−σ is the price index for a
basket of goods, and E is the aggregate consumption expenditure.
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3.2 Producers
Production.—We assume there are a countable finite number of varieties, each produced
by a single incumbent firm in the industry. Each firm is also allowed to produce multiple
products. Specifically, variety ω is produced by a firm with productivity ϕ according to
the following production function:
Y = exp(ϕ)(KaL1−a)1−ηZη (2)
where K and L respectively denote capital and labor inputs employed, and Z denotes
the intermediate inputs bundle employed in final variety production. The intermedi-
ates bundle Z is assembled by combining one bundle of continuum intermediate inputs
produced domestically, D, and another bundle of diverse intermediate inputs imported











where ς is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign bundles of



















where d (l) represents the firm’s use of a domestic input l, and m (h) represents the
quantity of a foreign input h imported by that firm. Ω is a firm-specific constant set
containing all imported input varieties.5 The elasticity of substitution among domestic
inputs and the elasticity of substitution among foreign inputs are assumed to be identical
and denoted by θ > 1 .6
Import Decision.—Conditional on being an importer, the decisions a firm then needs
to make are which varieties to import and how much of each variety to import. To simplify
the derivation, we assume that the scope decision is exogenously given, and hence the set
of imported varieties for a firm is fixed.7
5We assume no fixed costs for importing exists.
6Alternatively, we can assign different θ’s to inputs within domestic varieties and to those within
foreign varieties. However, the propositions would be preserved.
7If we allow this set to vary endogenously, an input tariff reduction would induce the firm to import
more varieties if assumptions are made as in Gopinath and Neiman (2014). Enlarging the set of imported
varieties would further decrease marginal costs and increase markups.
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The firm chooses labor L, capital K, and the amounts of domestic intermediate inputs
d (l), given the wage rate w, the rental rate r, and the prices of domestic intermediate
inputs p (l). The firm also chooses the amount of each imported variety m (h), given each
foreign input’s price p (h) and the import tariff τ (h) levied on each imported product h.
Given the above production function and the firm’s productivity ϕ, the marginal cost of





















ηη(1−η)1−η denotes the marginal cost in-
dex for a non-importing firm. To derive the marginal cost index for an importing firm, we













Given the demand equation (1), the profit maximization problem of a product ω produced
by a firm with productivity ϕ is given by:
max
p(ω)




Since the number of final-good varieties is finite, a change in p (ω) will affect the price
index P . Taking the first-order condition with respect to p (ω) implies that:
1− σ (p (ω)− c (ω))
p (ω)








1−σ = s (ω) (9)
is the market share of final good ω. Reorganizing the first-order condition (8), we
have:
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(σ − 1) (1− s (ω))
)
(10)
We use µ (ω) = ln(p(ω)
c(ω)
) to denote the markup charged by a firm with productivity ϕ
for its final good ω. The previous equation (10) implies that the firm-product markup:




(σ − 1) (1− s (ω))
)
(11)
is clearly an increasing function of good ω’s market share s (ω).
Taking the total differentiation of the firm-product markup function, we obtain:
∆ lnµ (ω) = Γ (ω) ∆ ln s (ω) = − (σ − 1) Γ (ω) (1− s (ω)) ∆ ln p (ω)
= − (σ − 1) Γ (ω) (1− s (ω)) (∆ lnµ (ω) + ∆ ln c (ω))
where Γ (ω) = s(ω)
1−s(ω)
1
(σ−1)(1−s(ω))+1 > 0. Hence, the change in markup can be written
as a function of the change in marginal costs:
∆ lnµ (ω) = − (σ − 1) Γ (ω) (1− s (ω))
1 + (σ − 1) Γ (ω) (1− s (ω))
∆ ln c (ω) (12)
As a result, the firm-product markup is decreasing with the firm-product marginal
cost. According to equation (6), a high-productivity firm would have low marginal costs
and hence set high markups. This is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. A more efficient firm charges higher markups.
During trade liberalization, a reduction in import tariff τh leads to a fall in the price
index of imported inputs, PM , and hence a decrease in the cost-reduction factor B.
Equation (6) then implies that the marginal cost c also falls accordingly. Based on
equation (12), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Given productivity, a reduction in import input tariffs induces a firm to
charge a higher markup for its output products.
This proposition applies to the firm’s whole line of products in general, and in par-
ticular, to the firm’s exported products. Since our focus is on incumbent importers and
exporters, we will test the above proposition using exported products in the empirical
part of this paper. The empirical results derived from Chinese trade data turn out to sup-
port our theoretical claims, that is, trade liberalization can indeed induce firms to charge
higher markups for their exports, even after we control for variations in productivity.
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4 Identification and measurement
In this section, we first present our identification strategy, which takes advantage of the
differences between ordinary and processing trade. Note that processing trade firms are
exempted from paying import tariffs. Thus they serve as a natural comparison group
to identify the causal relationship between tariff reductions and markup adjustments at
the firm-product level. We then describe the data sample and measurements used in our
empirical analysis.
4.1 Identification strategy: ordinary trade vs. processing trade
Processing trade is very common in Chinese trading firms (Yu, 2015; Manova and Yu,
forthcoming). It can exist in one of two forms in customs documents: “processing with
supplied inputs” and “processing with imported inputs.” The former refers to the situ-
ation in which a Chinese firm receives inputs from its trading partners, assembles them
into final goods, and directly exports these goods back to the same trading partners. The
latter refers to the situation in which a Chinese firm pays for imported inputs from foreign
suppliers, and exports all processed goods with no intent to sell domestically. Both types
of processing trade firms enjoy duty-free treatment. In the presence of processing trade,
a firm falls into one of the following three categories: a non-importing firm, an ordinary
importer, or a processing importer. As processing trade firms are not subject to import
tariffs, our expectation is that the marginal cost effect does not apply to them.
To identify the causal effects of tariff reductions on markup adjustments, we compare
the responses by ordinary and processing firms to tariff cuts, and the unique Chinese data
allows us to do so. Note that trade types are identified at the firm-product level instead
of at the firm level. This is because a sizable portion of firms, also called hybrid firms,
may conduct both ordinary and processing trade for their various products. At the firm
level, pure ordinary firms, pure processing firms, and hybrid firms account for 36.31%,
23.20%, and 40.49% of total trade, respectively. Defining ordinary and processing trade
at the firm-product level thus allows us to clearly distinguish between the two trade
regimes according to customs records. Moreover, this definition is in congruence with the
estimated firm-product markups.8
8It is possible that a firm-HS6-product pair still involves both processing and ordinary trade since
exports can be directed to different destinations. But the proportion of this kind of “hybrid” firm-product
only accounts for 9.31% of total trade in our sample.
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4.2 Firm-product trade data and firm-level production data
With regard to the estimation of firm-product markups, on the one hand, we need to rely
on product-level trade data to obtain export prices, export values, and trade regimes;
on the other hand, we must use firm-level production data to measure firm attributes
(e.g., TFP). Therefore, before we can proceed, merging the following two databases is
required: (1) a firm-product-level trade database that records each transaction through
Chinese customs, and (2) a firm-level production database collected and maintained by
the NBSC. Our sample period runs from 2000 to 2006.9
Firm-product-level trade data.—The customs’ transaction-level trade data is from Chi-
na’s General Administration of Customs. This database provides information on HS8
product characteristics, covering the universe of all Chinese imports and exports during
2000 to 2006. It records all details for each trade transaction, including import or ex-
port values, quantities, products, source and destination countries, firm contacts (e.g.,
company name, telephone, zip code, and contact person), enterprise types (e.g., state
owned, domestic private, foreign invested, or joint venture), and customs regimes (e.g.,
“Processing and Assembling”or “Processing with Imported Materials”). As processing
trade firms pay no tariffs, we focus on ordinary trade firms and use processing trade firms
as a placebo test sample. We aggregate transaction-level trade data to the firm-product
level. To ensure the consistency of product categorizations over time, we aggregate HS8
products to the HS6 level. 10 Therefore, a product in this paper refers to an HS6 product
category. Also, note that we focus only on manufacturing products in this database to
maintain consistency.11
Firm-level production data.—To characterize firm characteristics (e.g., TFP and cap-
ital intensity), we use NBSC firm-level production data drawn from annual surveys sent
to all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales
larger than 5 million RMB (Chinese currency). This NBSC database contains detailed
firm-level information on Chinese manufacturers, including employment, capital stock,
gross output, value added, and firm contacts, similar to the Customs database.12 Con-
sidering the case of misreports, we remove unsatisfactory observations according to the
9In robustness checks, we employ a third database that is also taken from the NBSC and contains
physical-quantity output information for single-product firms. The goal is to resolve doubt about the
problem of omitted firm-specific prices, which occurs when revenue-based measures are used to estimate
TFP and markups (see Section 6 for more explanations).
10At the HS8 level, although the first six digits of HS-codes follow international standards, Chinese
customs’ officials frequently change the last two digits. Hence, we convert 2002 HS-codes into 1996
HS-codes at the six-digit HS level based on UN Comtrade specifications.
11Originally, there were 20 sectors included in the UN list of HS product classifications (see
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/HS-Classification-by-Section). We omit sectors 1
to 3 (agricultural sectors), sector 5 (the mining sector), and sector 19 (arms and ammunition).
12This information on firm identity is what we used to match the NBSC database with the customs
database.
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following protocols: (i) total assets must be higher than liquid assets; (ii) total assets
must be higher than total fixed assets; (iii) total assets must be higher than the net value
of fixed assets; (iv) the firm identification number cannot be missing and must be unique;
and (v) the established time must be valid. These protocols are in accordance with Cai
and Liu (2009) and General Accepted Accounting Principles.
Matching the two databases.—Finally, we are ready to match the customs trade data
with the NBSC production data. The match is based on common entries found in the
two databases: various contacts of manufacturing firms, as there exists no consistent
coding system on firm identity for them. Our matching procedure is carried out in three
steps: (1) by company name, (2) by telephone number and zip code, and (3) by telephone
number and contact person name (see a detailed description of the matching process in
Fan, Lai and Li, 2015). Compared to exporting and importing firms reported in the
customs database,13, the matching rate of our merged sample (in terms of the number
of firms) covers 45.3% of all exporters and 40.2% of all importers. Respectively, these
correspond to 52.4% of total export values and 42% of total import values reported by
the customs database.14
4.3 Measure of firm-product markup
This section describes the construction process of measures for firm-product markups.
As shown by De Loecker et al. (2016), the markup for product h produced by firm f at


















the share of output revenue spent on inputs for product h produced by firm f at time t:
the denominator PfhtQfht represents firm f ’s total revenue earned from selling product
h at time t, and the numerator P υfhtV
υ
fht represents firm f ’s expenditure on input V
υ
fht.
Equation (13) lays down the foundation for our estimation. To compute the markup,
we need to know the output elasticity θυfht and the ratio of input expenditure to total
sales αυfht. First of all, consider the following translog production function:
qfht = f (xfht; β) + ϕft + εfht (14)
13When we merge the customs database with manufacturing firms listed in the NBSC database, we
exclude observations labeled as intermediary firms and trading companies by Chinese customs.
14We do not compare the size of our merged sample to that of the NBSC database because the NBSC
data does not indicate a firm’s import status.
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where lowercase letters denote the log of uppercase letters.15 The quantity of product
h by firm f at time t, qfht, is produced using a set of firm-product-year specific inputs,
xfht. The error term εfht captures measurement errors in recording output values and
any unanticipated shocks to output. Following De Loecker et al. (2016), the productivity
term ϕft is assumed to be Hicks-neutral and firm-specific.
For multi-product firms, due to data limitations, it is difficult to determine how inputs
are allocated across different products within a firm. Let us denote the log of input X’s
share in producing h as ρXfht = xfht − xft. In this equation, xft is the observable total
input expenditure by firm f . xfht is the non-observable input expenditure allocated to
product h for any input X = {L,M,K}, where L, M , and K respectively denote labor,
materials, and capital. Substituting this expression in equation (14) yields:





Since we do not observe multi-product firms’ input allocation across products, the
production function (15) contains an extra error term, Afht (·), when compared to the
previous equation (14). In general, this component error will be a function of three
arguments: the unobserved input shares ρXfht, the firm-level input expenditure xft, and
the production function coefficients β. In the case of a translog production function, the
log input xft is a vector containing labor, materials, and capital as well as all second-order
interaction terms between any two among them; the vector of coefficients can be written
as β = (βl, βm, βk, βll, βmm, βkk, βlm, βlk, βmk).
16 Based on the methodology in De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (2016), we use the firm-level production
survey data from the NBSC to estimate the set of coefficients, β, in the production
function qft = f (xft; β) + ϕft + εft (see Appendix B for more details).
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be the input cost share of product h, where X̃ft denotes total
deflated expenditures on all inputs used by firm f at time t. We assume that ρfht does
not vary across inputs so that we can solve for this share as follows. In order to eliminate
unanticipated shocks and measurement errors that are present in the output data, we
15A general expression for this translog production function with labor, capital, and material as input






fht + βlmlfhtmfht +
βmkmfhtkfht + βklkfhtlfht + ϕft + εfht.
16In Section 5.3 and 6.1, as a robustness check, we also use an alternative specification by adding triple
interaction terms to this production function.
17We replace quantity with the deflated revenue of total sales since production quantity data is un-
available at the firm level. In other words, the firm-level estimation uses the deflated revenue as a proxy
of qft for each firm, where the 4-digit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) industry-level output de-
flators are taken from Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012). Note that we do have quantity data
for only exported products and will use this information for each exported product when we estimate
firm-product markups of exported product later. As for robustness checks, we will also employ a new
dataset that contains physical quantity of output qft for single-product firms only. Our results are robust
to various measures of firm-product markups, as can been seen in Section 5.3 and 6.1.
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project product h’s export quantity qfht in year t on a list of variables to obtain its
predicted value. The variables in the list include inputs, input/output tariffs, the output
price, processing trade dummies, interactions between processing trade dummies and
input/output tariffs, region-industry-product dummies, and time fixed effects. 18





Using equation (15), ϕ̂fht satisfies:




= ϕft + âftρfht + b̂ftρ
2
fht
where the second equal sign follows from applying our translog production function to
Afht (·). The coefficient terms âft and b̂ft are both functions of the estimated parameter
vector β̂.19
Given ϕ̂fht, âft and b̂ft, we can then calculate the firm’s productivity and input
allocations for each year. Specifically, we solve for the J + 1 unknowns (ϕft, ρf1t, ..., ρfJt)
in a system of J+1 equations.20 Note that we need to modify the proportional assumption
made in De Loecker et al. (2016), which says that the sum of input shares across products
equals to one. This modification is due to limitations of the Chinese trade data. Most
firms in our sample are not pure exporters and, therefore, they also have domestic sales
that are not observable at the firm-product level. As a result, we cannot borrow the
assumption from De Loecker et al. (2016).21 Instead, following Kee and Tang (2016), we
18We also measure firm-product markups by projecting deflated export revenue instead of export
quantity. We find that doing this would not qualitatively affect our main results. The empirical results
based on other projection methods are available upon request.
19The coefficient terms âft and b̂ft respectively satisfy:
âft = β̂l + β̂m + β̂k + 2
(
β̂lllft + β̂mmmft + β̂kkkft
)
+ β̂lm (lft +mft) + β̂lk (lft + kft) + β̂mk (mft + kft) ;
b̂ft = β̂ll + β̂mm + β̂kk + β̂lm + β̂lk + β̂mk.
20This system of J + 1 equations consists of the following equations:




ϕ̂fJt = ϕft + aftρfJt + bftρ
2
fJt,
plus the equation that the sum of ρfht over the product line for any firm f at time t equals the share
of total export in the total sales of that firm. This last equation differs from the equation used in De
Loecker et al. (2016): the sum of ρfht over all products for any firm f at time t equals to one.
21Section 5.3 and 6.1 show that this assumption plays little role in this paper, since our results stay
virtually unchanged when we maintain the original assumption and repeat our analysis in a subsample
of pure Chinese exporters.
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assume that the share of inputs allocated to exports production is proportional to the
share of exporting value in total sales. This implies that, for any firm f at time t, the
sum of ρfht across products is equal to the ratio of total exports to total sales.
A numerical procedure is conducted in solving the aforementioned system of J + 1
equations for each firm and each year.22 We now have all the ingredients to compute











where the product-specific output elasticity for materials θ̂Mfht is a function of the
production function coefficient, PfhtQfht is product h’s export value directly obtained




ft denotes the materials allocated to produce
product h.23
Finally, marginal costs for product h at time t are recovered by subtracting the markup
from the log price according to the following equation:
m̂cfht = ln (Pfht)− µ̂fht (18)
Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes our markup estimates for ordinary trade ob-
servations (columns 1 to 5) and processing trade observations (columns 6 to 10). For
each trade regime, we also employ other approaches to measure firm-product markups.
These approaches include the use of an additional quantity-based dataset, an alternative
production function specification, a small sample that includes only pure exporters, and
a theoretical markup measure that only requires observable market shares and substi-
tution elasticities. The benchmark estimates are reported in columns 1 and 6, and the
additional four estimates are reported in columns 2 and 7, columns 3 and 8, columns 4
and 9, and columns 5 and 10, sequentially. In all sectors, the average markup is higher
than 1. The highest firm-product markup for ordinary trade firms occurs in the industry
of Communication Equipment, Computers and Other Electronic Equipment (2-digit CIC
22Similar to De Loecker et al. (2016), we find that conditional on converging to an interior solution
(i.e., all the product’s input shares fall in the range between 0 and the ratio of total exports to total
sales of that firm, non-inclusive), the solution for the equation system is unique regardless of what initial
values are assigned to all unknowns. Out of the total sample of multi-product firm-year pairs, we drop
no more than 0.5% of all observations in the total sample to eliminate the possibility of having a corner
solution.
23The expression of the materials output elasticity for product h at time t is:
θ̂Mfht = β̂m + 2β̂mm (ρ̂fht +mft) + β̂lm (ρ̂fht + lft) + β̂mk (ρ̂fht + kft) (17)
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industry code 40).
4.4 Measure of tariff
To construct measures for output tariffs, we first draw the tariff lines from the WTO and
from the trade analysis and information system (TRAINS). Then, we map two coding
systems: the harmonized system (HS) 8-digit codes used to categorize tariffs, and the
3-digit-input-output table from China that is used to classify products. After the map-
ping, our 3-digit output tariffs are just the simple average of all tariffs that fall into the
corresponding category of the 3-digit IO industry code.24
To compute measures for input tariffs, we adopt the approach suggested by Amiti







In this equation, τ outputkt is the output tariff imposed on industry k at time t; aki is the
weight assigned to industry k, or equivalently, it is the percentage of industry i’s total
costs that were expended on products supplied by industry k as intermediate inputs for
industry i. For instance, if industry i incurs 80% of its total costs in steel and 20% of
its total costs in rubber, then when we calculate the input tariff in industry i, we would
assign an 80% weight on the steel industry’s output tariff and a 20% weight on the rubber
industry’s output tariff.
Since our production data utilizes the CIC 4-digit codes, we still need to map IO 3-
digit tariffs into the CIC coding system. This procedure yields a set of input and output
tariffs at the CIC 4-digit level, which constitutes the foundation for our main results.
Nevertheless, we report the results using firm-level and HS6 product-level input/output
tariffs as well (see Section 6.2), and our main results remain unchanged. At the industry
level, Figure 3 presents our calculations for input and output tariffs in China during 2000-
2006. These downward-sloping lines reveal that the Chinese tariff rates have dropped
drastically since China became a member of the WTO in 2001.
5 Specifications and main results
This section describes our econometric models and presents the associated regression
results. The baseline specification is estimated based on the sample of ordinary trading
24Here we use the 2002 version of IO table. Replacing it with the 2007 version of the IO table would
not affect our results.
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firms. We use processing exporters (never subject to import tariffs) as a placebo sample
to verify the causal effect of tariff reductions on markup raises. If we decompose markup
into output elasticity and input share, and regress each of them on our explanatory
variables, the results are supportive to the baseline outcomes.
Then, we test the marginal-cost and the import-dependence effects, which are argued
by our theory as underlying mechanisms driving the causal relation of interests. Next,
we discuss movements in export prices and the role played by quality adjustments. After
that, we experiment with different estimates of firm-product markups (based on the new
quantity-based data, an alternative production function, a subsample of pure exporters,
and a procedure implied by the model) to validate the baseline results. Finally, we
alter our empirical specifications by incorporating difference estimators and instrumental
variables.
5.1 Trade liberalization effects on markups
We quantitatively examine in this part how firms’ markups respond to tariff reductions
during trade liberalization in China. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of key vari-
ables in our sample, such as markups, tariffs, and firm- and industry-level characteristics.
Recall that the sample is divided into two regimes: ordinary trade and processing trade.
Baseline regression.—Our model suggests that, besides the typical pro-competitive
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade
Variable Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
log(markup) 0.04 0.11 2.69 -0.08 0.13 2.27
Input tariff 0.1 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.1 0.04
Output tariff 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.06
log(TFP) 0.13 -0.04 0.61 0.09 -0.05 0.59
log(Labor) 5.73 5.65 1.2 5.95 5.87 1.15
log(Capital/Labor) 3.79 3.79 1.21 3.67 3.63 1.22
log(Wage) 2.57 2.53 0.6 2.53 2.51 0.61
Industry wage 13.49 13.01 5 12.73 11.9 4.62
Industry capital intensity 68.28 53.24 55.89 58.47 44.8 52.9
Industry skill intensity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Herfindahl index 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
Notes: The summary statistics for ordinary trade firms are reported in the
first three columns and processing trade firms the last three columns. Of
the 155,292 observations in our sample, 105,051 are ordinary trade firms and
50,241 are processing trade firms.
effects caused by changes in output tariffs, trade liberalization may affect firm markups
via the marginal-cost channel brought up by changes in input tariffs. To test the overall
effect of trade liberalization on markups, we adopt the following regression equation as
our baseline specification:
µfht = κ1 input tariff it + κ2 output tariff it + κ3Eft + κ4Sit + δt + δs + δfh + εfht (19)
where µfht denotes the estimated firm-product markups for HS6 product h produced
by firm f in year t, and the subscript i denotes a 4-digit CIC industry. The vector
of firm-level controls, Eft, accounts for firm characteristics, such as productivity, size
of employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage, that could potentially influence
markups. The vector of industry-level controls, Sit, includes industrial average wage
(WAGE), capital intensity (KL), skill intensity measured by the ratio of college workers
to total employees (SKILL), and the Herfindahl index (HHI). These industry charac-
teristics are computed at the 4-digit CIC level each year to capture the endowment and
competition effects in any industry. We also control for the time fixed effect (δt), the
2-digit CIC sector/industry fixed effect (δs), and the firm-product fixed effect (δfh), to
account for all factors that are time-varying, sector, and firm-product related. Because
industry-level tariffs are the variables of interest in equation (19), we cluster error terms
at the industry-year pair to address the issue of potential correlations between errors
within each industry over time. Our baseline model predicts a negative coefficient on
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input tariffs for ordinary trade firms, and an insignificant effect of trade liberalization on
markups for the placebo sample of processing trade firms who are, by law, not subject
to import duties. The placebo results will be reported in comparison with the results for
ordinary trade.
Table 2: Impact of Tariffs on Markups
Dependent variable: Firm-product markup
Sample of Ordinary Trade Sample of Processing Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Input tariff -2.793** -2.384** -4.454*** -3.443*** 0.168 0.548 -0.709 0.336
(1.214) (1.170) (1.372) (1.299) (2.023) (1.828) (1.734) (1.577)
Output tariff 0.915 0.771 1.525* 1.279 -1.687 -1.455 -0.728 -0.612
(0.876) (0.850) (0.907) (0.840) (2.228) (1.989) (1.579) (1.417)
log(TFP) 0.920*** 0.974*** 0.948*** 1.020***
(0.051) (0.041) (0.055) (0.042)
log(Labor) -0.050 -0.046 0.001 -0.035
(0.032) (0.029) (0.038) (0.036)
log(Capital/Labor) 0.023 0.010 0.072*** 0.049**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023)
log(Wage) 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.008
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
WAGE 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
KL 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SKILL 1.482 0.008 5.746 5.022
(2.457) (2.426) (5.556) (5.760)
HHI 0.656 0.708 0.289 0.222
(0.409) (0.476) (0.548) (0.556)
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575824 575824 575824 575824 168813 168813 168813 168813
R-squared 0.876 0.877 0.858 0.859 0.859 0.861 0.846 0.849
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-
year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trade, and specifications 5-8 refer to processing
trade. In specifications 3-4 and 7-8 we run regressions weighted by the number of observations in each 2-digit CIC
industry.
Ordinary trade.—First of all, we run several regressions specified by equation (19)
with ordinary trade observations. The results are reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table
2. As can be seen, the estimated coefficients of input tariffs are significantly negative.
In terms of magnitude, a 1% reduction in input tariff leads to a markup increase by
2-3% for unweighted regressions (columns 1 and 2), and a markup increase by 3-4% for
weighted regressions (columns 3 and 4). In each pair of columns (columns 1 and 2 and
columns 3 and 4), the first column and the second column respectively report the results
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”without” and ”with” controlling for firm/industry-level characteristics. The magnitude
of input-tariff effects on markups is fairly stable across all four columns.
We run weighted regressions in columns 3 and 4 because markups are estimated with
various degrees of accuracy and we would like to reflect our priorities on high-precision
estimates. Since production function estimations (which generate markup estimates) are
conducted at the 2-digit CIC sector level, we are more confident about a firm-product
markup estimate when there are more observations in the firm-product’s parent sector.
Thus, following De Loecker et al. (2016), we weigh conventional regressions by the num-
ber of observations used to estimate each 2-digit CIC sector production function. Our
coefficients of interest in columns 3 and 4 have the same sign as those in columns 1 and
2, but the magnitude of coefficients in weighted regressions is larger than the magnitude
of those in unweighted regressions. This suggests that we have successfully pulled the
regressions towards matching markups in the high-precision region.
Turning to the output-tariff effects on markups, the corresponding coefficients are
positive but only occasionally significant. This is consistent with the pro-competitive
effects that have been intensively studied in the previous literature: lower output tar-
iffs during trade liberalization intensify competition in the final goods market and thus
reduce domestic firms’ pricing power and markups. Note that the coefficients on TFP
are significantly positive. This indicates that more productive firms would charge higher
markups, providing supportive evidence to Proposition 1.
Processing trade.—Secondly, we repeat the above regressions with processing trade
observations. As firms that conduct processing trade are not subject to tariffs, we expect
the impact of tariffs to be absent among those firms. Results in columns 5 to 8 of Table 2
confirm our belief: in all specifications employed, none of them suggests that import tariffs
(both input and output tariffs) significantly affect the processing trade firms’ markups.
Decomposition of markup.—Lastly, when estimating firm-product (log) markups, we
recover estimates for firm-product specific output elasticity θ and firm-product specific
share of input expenditure α. According to equation (13), an estimated (log) markup
is the (log) ratio of output elasticity to input share. Therefore, we can decompose the
markup into two components, θ and α, and separately regress these two components on
input tariffs.
But regressing θ on tariffs is inconsistent with our model, as it assumes a Cobb-
Douglas production function, in which θ is a constant unaffected by tariff reductions and
only α falls with input-tariff reductions. To solve this inconsistency issue, we deviate
from our theory by assuming a translog production function, in which θ is no longer a
constant but α still falls with input-tariff reductions. Since a translog output depends
on the squares of capital, labor, and material, as well as the interaction terms between
any two of all squared terms, input-tariff reductions induce production to expand more
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via more labor employed, more materials depleted, or more capital invested, and hence
generate a higher output elasticity.
Given translog production functions are utilized in markup estimations (see Section
4.3), we can empirically test the effect of input-tariff reductions on either θ or α. The
results are shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix.25 As expected, for the ordinary trade
sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table A.2), when the dependent variable is output elasticity,
the coefficients on input tariffs are significantly negative, bearing the same sign when we
regress markups on tariffs, while for the processing trade sample (columns 3 and 4 of
Table A.2), the significance disappears. In contrast, when the dependent variable is α,
the coefficients on input tariffs become significantly positive, suggesting a lower share of
input expenditure after tariff reductions. Again, this pattern applies only to the ordinary
trade sample but not to the processing trade sample.
5.2 The underlying mechanisms
Import dependence channel.—Our model studies markup adjustments by an incumbent
trading firm that imports intermediate inputs. The predictions are that a reduction in
tariffs would lead to an increase in markups, and this effect would be more profound
for firms with higher import intensity. The theoretical mechanism underlying the latter
prediction is described as follows.
During trade liberalization, import-tariff reductions decrease the price index PM of
imported inputs and hence lower the cost-reduction factor B. If we let τh = τ for all im-
ported inputs, then the change in the cost-reduction factor after import-tariff reductions
should satisfy:









1−ς is the share of total input expenditures spent on imported inter-
mediates. Consider any firm with a higher import share, import-tariff reductions would
result in a larger decline in lnB, and hence a larger decline in ln c with c denoting
the marginal cost (see equation (6)).26 A smaller marginal cost in turn leads to higher
markups.
Therefore, we expect that importers would extract more benefits from tariff reductions
than non-importers, and given all other conditions being equal, an importing firm with
25Nevertheless, we repeat these regressions with Cobb-Douglas production functions. The results stay
unchanged and are available upon request.
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Table 3: The Effect of Tariffs on Markups through the Import-Dependence Channel
Dependent variable: Firm-product markups
unweighted ordinary weighted ordinary unweighted processing weighted processing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Input tariff -1.315 -2.004 -1.917 -3.075** -0.920 0.441 0.235 0.279
(1.248) (1.220) (1.408) (1.331) (2.511) (2.000) (2.152) (1.682)
Output tariff 0.718 0.777 1.176 1.299 -1.448 -1.471 -0.611 -0.621
(0.850) (0.854) (0.834) (0.838) (1.990) (1.985) (1.416) (1.412)
Input tariff × Importing firm -1.267*** -1.763*** 1.447 0.094
(0.450) (0.489) (1.648) (1.791)
Importing firm 0.168*** 0.220*** -0.181 -0.034
(0.049) (0.051) (0.177) (0.179)
Input tariff × Import share -3.105* -3.752*** 0.308 0.146
(1.634) (1.322) (1.134) (0.750)
Import share 0.686*** 0.704*** 0.034 0.033
(0.211) (0.176) (0.156) (0.123)
log(TFP) 0.919*** 0.903*** 0.972*** 0.958*** 0.948*** 0.942*** 1.020*** 1.014***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.041) (0.042) (0.055) (0.056) (0.042) (0.044)
Other Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575824 575824 575824 575824 168813 168813 168813 168813
R-squared 0.877 0.877 0.859 0.859 0.861 0.861 0.849 0.849
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-
year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trade, and specifications 5-8 refer to processing trade.
In columns 1-2 and 5-6 we run unweighted regressions, and in columns 3-4 and 7-8 we run regression weighted by the
number of observations in each 2-digit CIC industry. Other firm-level controls include firm size measured by employment,
capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage, capital intensity, share of
college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level. The results stay unchanged when
we exclude firm-level and industry-level controls.
higher import intensity would gain more than its peers with lower import intensity:
µfht = κ1 input tariff it + κ2 output tariff it + κ5 import statusft
+ κim input tariff it import statusft + κ3Eft + κ4Sit + δt + δs + δfh + εfht
(21)
where the firm-specific variable import status could either be a dummy, importing
firm, which equals one for an importer and zero otherwise, or a continuous variable,
import share, which is the firm’s import intensity measured by the ratio of the cost
of imported inputs to the total cost of all intermediate inputs. In estimating equation
(21), we expect the coefficient on import status, κ5, to be significantly positive, and the
coefficient on the interaction term, κim, to be significantly negative. This implies that a
firm that imports more tends to be more affected by input-tariff reductions and is more
23
likely to adjust markup to a higher level, ceteris paribus. Results reported in Table 3
conform to our expectations.
In Table 3, results for ordinary trade are shown in columns 1-4 to compare with
results for processing trade in columns 5-8. Columns 1 and 2, and 5 and 6 use unweighted
regressions, while columns 3 and 4, and 7 and 8 adopt weighted regressions. For an average
importer under the ordinary trade regime, the impact of input tariffs on markups is 96%
higher, with an unweighted regression in column 1, and 92% higher, with a weighted
regression in column 3, than its non-importing counterpart in corresponding columns 5
and 7. To be more precise, when we use the share rather than a dummy to measure
import intensity, a 10% increase in an average importer’s import intensity (compared
with non-importing firms) raises the input-tariff impact by about 15% for an unweighted
regression in column 2 and by 12% for a weighted regression in column 4. Note that,
in all specifications, the coefficients on the interaction term, κim, are always significantly
negative for ordinary trades, but will turn insignificant for processing trades. In sum,
ordinary trade firms with higher import intensity adjust markups more during trade
liberalization.
It is worth noting, however, that once we control for the interaction between input
tariff and import intensity, the coefficient of input tariff becomes less significant (columns
1-4 of Table 3 in contrast to columns 1-4 of Table 2). This is because our sample includes
both importers and non-importers. For importers, an input tariff reduction will signifi-
cantly raise their markups. In contrast, for non-importers, a decrease in input tariff will
not directly lower marginal costs, and hence the effect of input tariff on non-importers
markup would be insignificant; however, this effect is still negative because some non-
importers may use domestic inputs supplied by importers. In columns 1-4 of Table 2,
when import status and its interaction with input tariff are excluded, κ1 captures the
overall effect of input tariff on markup for a pool of importers and non-importers. So
its estimates are significantly negative. Turning to Table 3, when import status and the
interaction terms are added back, the direct effect of input tariff on importers markup is
absorbed by κ5 and κim. As a result, κ1 now represents only the indirect effect of input
tariff on non-importers markup, and hence its estimates become less significant than the
corresponding counterparts reported in Table 2.
Our empirical findings are also consistent with Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2014),
in which the authors show a positive correlation between import intensity and market
share, and moreover, they show that firms with larger market shares (therefore stronger
market power and higher markups) adjust markups more drastically in response to trade
liberalization. Therefore, our result that firms with higher import intensity greatly adjust
markups upon tariff reductions complements their work. In placebo tests using the sample
of processing trades, as can be seen from columns 5 to 8 of Table 3, we observe no
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significant effects for either the input tariff or its interaction with a firm’s import status.
Marginal cost channel.—In our model, marginal cost is a function of import tariff τ ,
conditional on firm productivity (see equations (6) and (20)).27 Our model predicts that
trade liberalization via input-tariff reductions would lower the price index of imported
inputs PM at first, and then lead to a fall in marginal costs while holding productivity
still. We therefore regress estimated marginal costs on input- and output-tariff reductions
directly with productivity controlled. The following specification is run with the hope of
seeing a significantly positive coefficient on input tariff :
mcfht = κ1 input tariff it + κ2 output tariff it +κ3Eft +κ4Sit + δt + δs + δfh + εfht. (22)
In addition to running the above specification, to further verify the importance of
the marginal-cost channel, we augment our baseline regression (19) by controlling for
marginal cost:
µfht = κ1 input tariff it+κ2 output tariff it+κmcmcfht+κ3Eft+κ4Sit+δt+δs+δfh+εfht.
(23)
If the marginal-cost channel indeed plays a role, then once the marginal costs are
included as an explanatory variable, we would witness attenuation of the impact of input
tariffs on markups. Hence the coefficient on marginal cost is of our interest in this
augmented specification. A significantly negative estimate of κmc would favor a marginal-
cost argument. More importantly, we expect the magnitude of the coefficient on input
tariff when regressing equation (23) should be statistically insignificant. The results
presented in Table 4 conform to our projections.
In columns 1-4 of Table 4, we present results for the ordinary trade sample. Using the
specification in equation (22), when we regress marginal costs on tariff without controlling
for firm- and industry-level characteristics, the coefficient on input tariff is significantly
positive at the 10% level. That is, a 1% input tariff reduction would lead to a fall in
marginal costs by approximately 2%. But when we repeat this regression with all controls
included, the estimated coefficient on input tariff becomes insignificant. This is due to
multicollinearity between the added firm characteristics, in particular log(TFP), and the
input tariff. The effect of tariff on marginal cost reduction is in large part functioning
27There is no information about prices of a Chinese firm’s products sold in its domestic market. For this
reason, we employ export prices to proxy domestic prices in calculating marginal costs. One advantage
of using export prices as proxies is that we can distinguish between two trading regimes, ordinary and
processing. This distinction plays a key role in our analysis.
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Table 4: The Effect of Tariffs on Markups through the Marginal-Cost Channel
Dependent variable: Firm-product marginal costs (1-2 and 5-6); Firm-product markups (3-4 and 7-8)
Sample of Ordinary Trade Sample of Processing Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
marginal cost markup marginal cost markup
Input tariff 2.133* 1.771 -0.689 -0.610 -0.212 -0.587 -0.038 -0.019
(1.178) (1.207) (0.538) (0.511) (1.980) (1.806) (0.443) (0.438)
Output tariff -0.859 -0.723 0.067 0.047 1.780 1.559 0.052 0.061
(0.902) (0.881) (0.243) (0.240) (2.150) (1.929) (0.279) (0.270)
Marginal cost -0.987*** -0.986*** -0.977*** -0.977***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
log(TFP) -0.891*** 0.041*** -0.917*** 0.053***
(0.051) (0.012) (0.055) (0.016)
Other Firm-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575824 575824 575824 575824 168813 168813 168813 168813
R-squared 0.879 0.880 0.985 0.985 0.893 0.895 0.990 0.990
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year
level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trade, and specifications 5-8 refer to processing trade. In
columns 1-2 and 5-6, the dependent variable is the firm-product-level marginal cost; in columns 3-4 and 7-8, the dependent
variable is the firm-product-level markup. Other firm-level controls include firm size measured by employment, capital-labor
ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained
employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level.
through the channel of an increased TFP. 28 Moreover, compared to the effect of tariff
reduction on ordinary firms (see columns 1 and 2), input tariff reduction has insignificant
and opposite impacts on processing firms’ marginal costs (see columns 5 and 6).
In columns 2 and 6 of Table 4, the coefficients on log(TFP) are significantly negative,
suggesting a negative relation between firm productivity and marginal costs: a more
productive firm has lower marginal costs regardless of the firm’s trade regime. When we
put marginal costs on the right-hand side of the baseline equation (23), the coefficients
on marginal costs are significantly negative, but, as expected, the effect of input tariff
becomes insignificant. This again provides a piece of evidence that supports our modeling
strategy: a large part of the input-tariff effect operates through the marginal-cost channel.
Incidentally, this empirical result also coincides with Proposition 1, which links higher
efficiency (i.e., lower marginal costs) to higher markups. The marginal-cost channel works
for both ordinary and processing trades, as we observe significantly negative coefficients
on marginal costs when we appoint markups as the dependent variable in columns 7 and
28If we look at supplementary Table A.4, where we use an alternative measure for markup (calculated
based on physical output data) to re-run the regressions in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the multi-
collinearity issue is mitigated, and the estimated coefficients of input tariff are 5% significant regardless
of whether firm-level characteristics are present or not.
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8. In sum, for both types of firms, markup adjustments are mainly driven by changes in
marginal costs, but the input-tariff effect is always absent for the processing trade sample
(see columns 5 to 8).
Export prices and quality adjustments.—Our model has the advantage of analyzing
movements of output prices, since equation (10) together with (12) yield the following
expression for the optimal price:
∆ ln p (ω) =
1
1 + (σ − 1) Γ (1− s (ω))
∆ ln c (ω) (24)
Equation (24) basically says that a reduction in import tariff τh would lead to a fall
in marginal cost c, and hence a decrease in export price. This implies a clear-cut effect
of trade liberalization on output prices when there is no quality upgrading.
As argued by De Loecker et al. (2016), when firms can freely choose quality degrees, a
drop in input tariffs would encourage firms to upgrade products’ quality. Higher quality
raises marginal costs, and increases output prices.29 Table 5 illustrates how output prices
respond to tariff changes for ordinary (columns 1 to 4) and processing traders (columns
5 to 8): input-tariff reductions raise export prices for firms under the ordinary trade
regime. This conclusion provides proof of quality upgrading during the sample period.
5.3 Alternative estimates of firm-product markups
This subsection estimates measures of firm-product markups using alternative method-
ologies, and checks the sensitivity of our benchmark results to these different measures.
In particular, we will use an additional dataset (i.e. the quantity-based data), a different
production function specification, and a smaller sample that includes only pure exporters.
We will also depart from the De Loecker et al. (2016)’s methodology and rely on our own
model to yield the measure of firm-product markup.
The benchmark results (see Tables 2-4) are obtained by estimating production func-
tion coefficients from the NBSC’s firm-level production survey data. This dataset is
revenue-based so it has to be deflated by the industry price index. However, it is possible
that firms are subject to firm-specific prices. Hence using industry price index instead
of firm-specific prices would create an omitted-variable bias (see a detailed illustration
in De Loecker and Goldberg (2014)). To solve this omitted variables problem, we use a
new database, that is, the physical-quantity firm-product production data for the period
2000-2006, which contains information on output quantity for each product (defined at
29Fan, Li and Yeaple (2015) also show that a reduction in input tariff induces firms to increase the
quality and price of their exports, this is especially so for industries with a large scope of quality differ-
entiation.
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Table 5: The Effects of Tariffs on Export Prices
Dependent variable: Firm-product export prices
Sample of Ordinary Trade Sample of Processing Trade
unweighted ordinary weighted ordinary unweighted processing weighted processing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Input tariff -0.660 -0.585 -1.611** -1.443** -0.043 -0.033 -0.663 -0.657
(0.539) (0.515) (0.648) (0.599) (0.442) (0.439) (0.459) (0.456)
Output tariff 0.056 0.038 0.362 0.313 0.093 0.098 0.454* 0.501*
(0.245) (0.243) (0.307) (0.294) (0.263) (0.257) (0.262) (0.263)
log(TFP) 0.027** 0.042*** 0.032* 0.048**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.024)
Other Firm-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575824 575824 575824 575824 168813 168813 168813 168813
R-squared 0.974 0.974 0.970 0.970 0.986 0.986 0.982 0.982
Notes: The dependent variable is the output’s unit price, defined as the deflated sales divided by quantities sold. *** p
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year level are in
parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trade, and specifications 5-8 refer to processing trade. Other firm-level
controls include firm size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include
industry average wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC
industry level.
the 5-digit product level) produced by each firm.
Fortunately, since this new database is also taken from the NBSC, it shares the same
firm identification with the previous production survey data, enabling us to easily merge
this new physical-quantity dataset with the existing survey data. When we use output
quantities instead of deflated revenues to estimate production functions, we focus on
single-product firms since all variables used in the estimation, except for output quanti-
ties, are only available at the firm-level.30 Moreover, we control for input prices (proxied
by output prices),31 market shares, and export status as suggested by De Loecker et al.
(2016), where they use a merged dataset (firm-level survey data plus quantity data) to
measure production functions.
An alternative measure of firm-product markups can be generated by using physical
30Products from the physical-quantity firm-product production database are defined more broadly than
those from the customs database. In other words, one product code in the physical-quantity database
could correspond to several HS-6 digit codes. As a result, a single-product firm in the physical-quantity
database turns into a multi-product firm after we merge the physical-quantity data with the customs
data.
31Input price reflects input quality. As explained in De Loecker et al. (2016), the quality-adjustment
mechanism would be alleviated if input prices are controlled for.
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Table 6: Robustness: Alternative Estimates of Firm-Product Markup
Panel A: Dependent variable is Firm-product-level markup
Quantity-based data Alternative production function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade Ordinary Trade Processing Trade
Input tariff -4.667** -4.775** -3.166 -3.211 -2.383** -2.045** -0.039 -0.209
(2.009) (1.967) (3.100) (3.160) (1.096) (1.015) (1.149) (1.104)
Output tariff 1.499 1.173 1.822 1.523 0.466 0.421 -1.018 -0.715
(1.215) (1.308) (1.751) (1.865) (0.723) (0.679) (1.067) (0.978)
log(TFP) 0.206** 0.039 1.065*** 1.054***
(0.102) (0.123) (0.049) (0.040)
Observations 170278 170278 56593 56593 606500 606500 182313 182313
R-squared 0.877 0.877 0.869 0.869 0.843 0.845 0.847 0.850
Panel B: Dependent variable is Firm-product-level markup
Pure exporters Market share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade Ordinary Trade Processing Trade
Input tariff -7.600*** -7.893*** 1.145 0.872 -0.150** -0.147** -0.144 -0.141
(2.826) (2.675) (2.477) (2.447) (0.068) (0.067) (0.120) (0.122)
Output tariff 0.824 1.498 -0.190 0.277 0.007 0.006 -0.017 -0.024
(2.008) (1.915) (1.872) (1.807) (0.036) (0.037) (0.063) (0.064)
log(TFP) 0.739*** 0.926*** 0.002 -0.002
(0.138) (0.103) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 100312 100312 53909 53909 575441 575441 167995 167995
R-squared 0.893 0.894 0.898 0.900 0.941 0.941 0.898 0.898
Panel A and B:
Other Firm-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the
industry-year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-2 and 5-6 use ordinary trade observations and specifications
3-4 and 7-8 use processing trade observations. The measure of firm-product markup used in specifications 1-4 of
panel is estimated based on physical quantity of output, in specifications 5-8 of panel A is estimated based on a
different form of production function, in specifications 1-4 in panel B is estimated based on pure exporting firms, and
in specifications 5-8 in panel B is estimated based on theoretical derivations. Other firm-level controls include firm
size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average
wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level.
When the method used to estimate markups changes, the solution to the system of equations also changes, thus
yielding different sample sizes.
outputs. This alternative measure turns out to be correlated, at a high level of 79.58%,
with our benchmark measure generated by using deflated revenues.32 A high correlation
between these two markup measures implies that using deflated sales instead of output
quantities in the benchmark case would be acceptable. Columns 1-4 in Panel A of Table
32The correlation between firm-level markups generated by these two datasets is 74.95%.
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6 report results for this alternative markup measure based on products’ physical quanti-
ties. Similar to the benchmark case, we again distinguish between ordinary trade regime
(columns 1 and 2) and processing trade regime (columns 3 and 4): a reduction in input
tariffs significantly increases markups for ordinary trade observations, while a similar
impact is absent for processing trade observations. As for underlying mechanisms, we
replicate all previous tests for known channels of import intensity and marginal costs. All
benchmark results hold when firm-product markup measures based on physical quantities
of output are used as proxies in all regressions (see Table A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix).
Firms with higher import-intensity are more affected by input-tariff reductions, and the
main channel of markup adjustment is through marginal costs.
Our benchmark results are also robust to different production function specifications.
In the benchmark, we use a translog production function of labor, capital, materials, and
their second-order interaction terms. The triple interaction term, lftkftmft, is ignored
due to computational complexities. But here we add back the triple interaction term and
re-calculate firm-product markups. This new markup measure is highly correlated with
its benchmark counterpart at a level of 81.74%.33 Columns 5-8 in Panel A of Table 6
present contrasting results of ordinary traded (columns 5 and 6) versus those of processing
trades (columns 7 and 8): a reduction in input tariffs significantly increases markups for
ordinary trade observations, while this is not so for processing trade observations.
An important assumption in De Loecker et al. (2016) is that input shares must sum up
to one across all products. Unfortunately, this assumption does not hold in our benchmark
since most firms in our matched sample export only a portion of their products. So, we
replace this assumption with the one made by Kee and Tang (2016): the share of inputs
allocated to export production is proportional to the share of exports in total sales. In
other words, summing up the input share spent in each export product is equal to the
ratio of exports to total sales. In order to show that this assumption replacement is not
driving of our results, we limit our sample to firms who export all of their products (or
pure exporters). This subsample accounts for approximately 16% of the observations in
our base sample, and in this subsample we can safely use the original assumption by De
Loecker et al. (2016). Our benchmark results still preserve as can be seen from columns
1 to 4 in Panel B of Table 6.
Despite robustness checks conducted earlier, one may still have doubts about other
unexploited limitations to our empirical strategy. Therefore, we consult our model for a
theoretical measure of firm-product markups based on observable variables. According to
equation (11), the firm-product markup can be written as a function of the firm-product
market share and the elasticity of substitution. We calculate market shares within the
HS 4-digit industry category, and allow the substitution elasticity σi to vary across HS
33The correlation between firm-level markups generated by these two production functions is 96.95%.
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2-digit industries as estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006).34 Columns 5 to 8 in Panel
B of Table 6 tell us that the hypothesized effects hold for ordinary trades but not for
processing trades.35
Table A.5 in the Appendix conducts extra tests with the model-based measure of
firm-product markups. In columns 1 to 4 of Table A.5, we calculate market shares within
the HS 2-digit code instead of the HS 4-digit code. In columns 5 to 8 of Table A.5, we set
σ = 6 and reproduce firm-product markups using equation (11).36 Once again, there are
significant impacts of input-tariff cuts on firm-product markups for the ordinary trade
sample (columns 1 and 2, and 5 and 6), and no such effects exist in the processing trade
sample (columns 3 and 4, and 7 and 8).
5.4 Difference estimator
This subsection tries an alternative econometric approach, namely the difference estima-
tors with lags ranging from 1 year to 5 years. As mentioned earlier, we retain controls
for changes in firm-level and industry-level characteristics as well as year fixed effects.
Unlike aforementioned regressions, we remove firm-product and industry fixed effects.
Table 7: The Effect of Tariffs on Markups: First-Difference and Long-Difference
Dependent variable: ∆(Firm-product markup)
Sample of Ordinary Trade Sample of Processing Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year
∆Input tariff -1.714* -3.351*** -3.306*** -5.060*** -4.066*** 0.398 -1.716 -0.702 -0.917 -0.062
(1.017) (1.067) (1.267) (1.266) (1.461) (1.434) (1.301) (1.138) (1.104) (1.334)
∆Output tariff 1.575* 0.773 -0.133 1.047 0.348 0.029 -0.394 0.674 0.196 -1.942
(0.904) (0.869) (0.942) (0.977) (1.036) (0.974) (1.090) (1.075) (1.210) (1.316)
∆log(TFP) 0.938*** 0.555*** 0.297*** 0.243*** 0.194* 0.930*** 0.549*** 0.298*** 0.376*** 0.421***
(0.044) (0.066) (0.071) (0.084) (0.110) (0.035) (0.061) (0.056) (0.085) (0.122)
Changes in Other Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 177564 89052 51844 28084 12964 59767 31359 20042 11240 6100
R-squared 0.0117 0.0066 0.0029 0.0031 0.0041 0.0167 0.0104 0.0037 0.0090 0.0106
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year level are in parentheses.
Specifications 1-5 refer to ordinary trade, and specifications 6-10 refer to processing trade. In columns 1 and 6 we adopt a one-year difference; in
columns 2 and 7 a two-year difference; in columns 3 and 8 a three-year difference; in columns 4 and 9 a four-year difference; in columns 5 and 10 a
five-year difference. Changes in other firm-level controls include the changes in firm size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average
wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit
CIC industry level. The results stay unchanged when we exclude firm-level and industry-level controls.
34Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticity of substitution for disaggregated categories. They
report the average and median elasticity to take values of 7.5 and 2.8, respectively. We aggregate their
estimates to the HS 2-digit level, and then merge the aggregates with our base sample.
35This model-based firm-product markup correlates with our benchmark markup by a degree of 8.52%.
36The related literature, such as Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Eaton and Kortum (2002),
suggests that a reasonable range for σ falls in the range of [5,10]
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The results of the difference estimation are reported in Table 7. We adopt first-
difference and long-difference estimators to evaluate the impact of tariff changes on
markup adjustment. The advantage of this approach is that differencing removes the
latent heterogeneity in the model, and hence addresses the omitted variables problem in
panel data. Our previous results still hold when difference estimators with various lagged
intervals are employed. To get a sense of the magnitude, a 1% reduction in input tariffs
would lead to a 2-5% increase in markups for ordinary trade observations. Again, the
input-tariff effects do not operate for processing trade observations.
Table 8: The Effect of Tariffs on Markups: Instrumental Variable Estimation
Dependent variable: ∆(Firm-product markup)
Sample of Ordinary Trade Sample of Processing Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5-year Difference 3-year Difference 5-year Difference 3-year Difference
∆Input tariff -5.851*** -5.636*** -4.696*** -4.275** -1.649 -1.240 -1.323 -1.065
(1.565) (1.597) (1.510) (1.697) (1.802) (1.770) (1.771) (1.797)
∆Output tariff 1.055 0.970 0.471 0.288 -1.288 -1.457 0.934 0.826
(1.116) (1.131) (1.094) (1.117) (1.515) (1.509) (1.314) (1.328)
∆log(TFP) 0.193* 0.193* 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.417*** 0.418*** 0.298*** 0.298***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.071) (0.071) (0.121) (0.121) (0.055) (0.055)
Changes in Other Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM χ2(1) statistic 47.907† 46.625† 68.446† 74.961† 42.750† 41.290† 56.774† 61.606†
Weak Instrument (F statistic) 609.194† 705.236† 304.115† 234.150† 348.036† 433.302† 248.222† 185.077†
Observations 12964 12964 51844 51844 6100 6100 20042 20042
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. † indicates significance at the 0.01 percent level (p-value < 0.0001). Robust standard
errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trade, and
specifications 5-8 refer to processing trade. In columns 1-2 and 5-6 we consider a five-year difference; in columns 3-4 and 7-8 a three-
year difference. In odd columns, we use the previous-year input tariff levels as instruments; in even columns, we adopt input tariff
levels in the initial year 2000 as instruments. Firm-level controls include changes in log of TFP, firm size measured by employment,
capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained
employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level. The results stay unchanged when we exclude firm-level and
industry-level controls.
5.5 Endogeneity
This subsection discusses the potential endogeneity issue of tariffs, as it may bias our
estimation with firm fixed-effects models according to Amiti and Konings (2007). In our
baseline regressions, we have already included industry and firm-product fixed effects,
and, from an individual firm’s perspective, tariff reductions should be exogenous. Nev-
ertheless, we relax the assumption of exogenous trade liberalization in China from 2000
to 2006, since it is possible that tariff levels are set subject to lobbying efforts. If the
political pressure is only industry specific but time invariant, then controlling for indus-
try fixed effects alleviate this endogeneity concern. If otherwise, the political pressure
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varies with time, we have to find instrument variables for input tariffs, and the results
are shown in Table 8. Following Amiti and Konings (2007), all IV specifications in Table
8 use difference estimators. Note that only results for 3-year and 5-year differences are
reported, as finding instruments to measure the changes in tariffs is much easier than
finding instruments to measure the levels of tariffs.
A frequently used instrument to establish tariff changes is past tariff levels (Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2005). Given that China entered the WTO in 2001 and started to reduce
tariffs significantly since then, we use two sets of variables — input-tariff levels in the
preceding year and in the initial year of 2000 — as instruments for input-tariff variations.
To assure the validity of our instruments, we construct two joint tests. The first
statistic is derived from a Langrange-Multiplier (LM) test, which diagnoses underidenti-
fication using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic. A usual canonical correlation
likelihood ratio test (Anderson, 1984) is inappropriate because the error term in our e-
conometric model is heteroskedastic.37 The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic tests
whether an instrument is relevant to the endogenous variable. The null hypothesis of an
underidentified model is rejected at the 0.1% significance level.
The second statistic is derived from the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald test, which
checks whether an instrument is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. The
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald F-statistics provide strong evidence to reject the null
hypothesis: the first stage is weakly identified at a highly significant level. That is to say,
in all specifications, our instrumental variables provide a good fit in the first stage, and
can be considered as valid instruments.
As before, results shown in Table 8 conform to our previous findings: for the ordinary
trade sample, input-tariff reductions significantly raise firm-product markups, while this
pattern is absent for the processing trade sample.
6 Robustness
This section further corroborates our main results by conducting more robustness checks,
such as adopting firm-level markup estimates, using firm-specific and product-specific
tariff measures, adding export tariffs, dropping outliers by various criteria, introducing
exchange rate shocks, and differentiating between firm ownership types.
37In all specifications, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are also well above their corresponding
critical values listed in Stock and Yogo (2005). However, we choose not to report since these critical
values are for i.i.d. errors while the error term in our econometric model is assumed to be heteroskedastic.
33
6.1 Effect of tariffs on firm-level markup
In the benchmark case, we measure markups at the firm-product level by merging the
firm-level NBSC survey data and the transaction-level customs data. Here, we use the
firm-level NBSC survey data alone to estimate corresponding markups at the firm level.
See Appendix B for a description of estimation procedures. Regression results based on
this firm-level markup measure are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. Similarly,
we can measure firm-level markups using different methodologies just as what we did
for firm-product level markups in Section 5.3. In particular, columns 3 and 4 of Table
9 use physical quantities instead of deflated revenues (see Appendix C for more details),
columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 add a triple interaction term to the translog production
function, and columns 7 and 8 of Table 9 investigate pure exporters.
In each specification, we make a distinction between ordinary trade regime (odd
columns) and processing trade regime (even columns). Table 9 presents similar results
to the benchmark case: input-tariff reductions increase firm-level markups for ordinary
trade observations but not for processing trade observations.38
6.2 Firm-specific and product-specific tariffs
Since our model describes a firm adjusting its markups on input-tariff reductions, com-
puting firm-level tariffs may be better at capturing information on the exact bundle of
inputs imported by each individual firm. Firm-level tariff measures provide high resolu-
tion to firm-specific intensive-margin effects of tariff reduction (Fan, Li and Yeaple, 2015),
complementing our previous results using industry-level input tariffs.
We follow Yu (2015) to compute firm-level tariffs. An exporter can engage in both
processing imports (denoted by P ) and ordinary imports (denoted by O). Define M =
O ∪ P as the set of the exporter’s total imports. Since processing imports are duty-free








where mki,t is firm i’s imports of an ordinary product k in year t, which would be
inversely associated with its corresponding tariff τ kt . To avoid this endogeneity problem
38Amiti and Konings (2007) show that, after a reduction in output tariffs, firms would face stronger
competition from imported final goods. Following their prediction, coefficients on output tariffs in Table
9 are indeed significantly positive for ordinary traders. Different from other tables where markups are
defined for export products, markups in Table 9 are defined for domestic products. When competition is
intensified due to output-tariff cuts, domestic-market-oriented firms have no choice but to lower markups
so that they can hold onto some market shares.
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Table 9: Robustness: The Effect of Tariffs on Firm-Level Markups
Dependent variable: Four estimates of firm-level markup
OT PT OT PT OT PT OT PT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Benchmark Quantity-based data Alternative function Pure exporters
Input tariff -0.496*** -0.135 -1.399*** -0.746 -0.348** -0.164 -1.019*** -0.037
(0.170) (0.353) (0.274) (0.563) (0.174) (0.354) (0.270) (0.415)
Output tariff 0.210** 0.095 0.356** -0.182 0.177* 0.091 0.390** 0.115
(0.097) (0.141) (0.154) (0.325) (0.099) (0.135) (0.186) (0.156)
log(TFP) 0.890*** 0.841*** 0.501*** 0.564*** 0.896*** 0.827*** 0.910*** 0.837***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.039) (0.088) (0.012) (0.022) (0.040) (0.032)
Other Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 126260 12872 33538 3842 126259 12872 22340 7127
R-squared 0.939 0.945 0.892 0.924 0.940 0.945 0.949 0.936
Notes: OT and PT stand for Ordinary Trade and Processing trade, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust
standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year level are in parentheses. Odd columns correspond to
ordinary trade observations, while even columns refer to processing trade observations. Other firm-level controls include
firm size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average
wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level. The
results stay unchanged when we exclude firm-level and industry-level controls.
well known in constructing the weighted tariff, we also calculate an unweighted average
of firm-specific input tariffs by setting the weight mki,t to 1.
In columns 1-4 of Table 10, we present results of regressing markups on firm-specific
tariffs for ordinary trades. Columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 refer to estimations for
weighted and unweighted average tariffs, respectively. We conclude that a 1% decrease
in firm-specific input tariff would lead to a 0.4-0.6% increase in firm-product markups for
ordinary trades. As anticipated, firm-level input tariffs have smaller effects than industry-
level counterparts (columns 1-4 in Table 10 vs. columns 1 and 2 in Table 2). Because
some firms may use intermediate inputs that are imported by other firms within the same
industry, and such intermediary activities would be captured by industry-level tariffs but
not by firm-specific input tariffs.39
Since HS6 product classification directly maps into China’s IO table, we are capable
of computing input and output tariffs at the HS6 product level. We then merge HS6
product-level tariffs with firm-product markups. The results of regressing markups on
HS6-product-specific tariffs are reported in columns 5-8 in Table 10: the input-tariff
39This also explains why the results with firm-specific input tariffs are only significant at approximately
the 20% level, if variables are clustered at the industry-year or the firm level.
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effects apply only to firms under the ordinary trade regime.
Table 10: Robustness: Firm-Specific and HS6-Product-Specific Tariffs
Dependent variable: Firm-product markup
Firm-level average tariff Industry tariff at the HS 6-digit level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weighted tariff Unweighted tariff Ordinary trade Processing trade
Input tariff -0.397** -0.373** -0.542** -0.558*** -2.460** -2.248** -1.859 -1.792
(0.159) (0.158) (0.214) (0.213) (1.056) (1.018) (1.200) (1.185)
Output tariff 0.694 0.764 -0.900 -0.662
(0.731) (0.701) (0.901) (0.901)
log(TFP) 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.909*** 0.954***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.051) (0.054)
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 287394 287394 287394 287394 560033 560033 164356 164356
R-squared 0.895 0.896 0.895 0.896 0.876 0.878 0.860 0.862
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Specifications 1-6 use ordinary trade observations and specifications 7-8
use processing trade observations. Specifications 1-4 adopt firm-specific weighted and unweighted tariffs according to Yu
(2015), and specifications 5-8 adopt industry-level input and output tariff at the HS6 level. Other firm-level controls include
firm size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average
wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level. For
columns 1-4, Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are not clustered (if we cluster variables at the industry-year
level or firm level in these columns, the results become significant only at approximately the 20% level; for columns 5-8,
robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year level are in parentheses.
6.3 Sensitivity to export tariffs, outliers, exchange rates, and
firm ownership types
Presumably, trade policies imposed by an exporter’s destination countries could also
affect the exporter’s firm-product markups of its exported goods. To address this issue,
we would like to control for export tariffs in each industry k at any time t. The measure
of export tariffs is constructed in three steps. First, for each product at the HS 6-digit
level, we calculate a weighted average export tariff with the product’s export value to
the corresponding country being the weight. Second, for each IO 3-digit industry, we
compute a simple average export tariff across all products in that industry. Third, we
map IO 3-digit industries into CIC 4-digit industries. Results shown in columns 1-4 if
Table 11 suggest that our benchmark results stay unchanged after controlling for export
tariffs.
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Then, in Table 11, we dispel misgivings about potential effects of the outliers. Column-
s 5-8 repeat the benchmark exercises after dropping observations ranked top and bottom
2.5 percentage according to their firm-product markups.40 The results are consistent with
our previous findings.
Table 11: Robustness: Sensitivity to Export Tariffs and Outliers
Dependent variable: Firm-product markup
Control for Export Tariff Delete Top and Bottom 2.5 Percentage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade Ordinary Trade Processing Trade
Input tariff -2.674** -2.181* 0.247 0.667 -2.558** -2.142** -0.647 -0.097
(1.225) (1.184) (2.001) (1.800) (1.016) (0.955) (0.792) (0.792)
Output tariff 0.839 0.614 -1.922 -1.766 0.822 0.742 -0.125 -0.079
(0.894) (0.866) (2.252) (2.005) (0.620) (0.599) (0.582) (0.557)
Export tariff 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
log(TFP) 0.928*** 0.957*** 0.829*** 0.842***
(0.052) (0.055) (0.038) (0.042)
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 565683 565683 166537 166537 544273 544273 163132 163132
R-squared 0.876 0.878 0.859 0.861 0.842 0.844 0.836 0.838
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-
year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-2 and 5-6 use ordinary trade observations, and specifications 3-4 and
7-8 use processing trade observations. In specifications 1-4 we control for export tariffs; in specifications 5-8 we delete
observations that fall into the top and bottom 2.5 percentile of markups. Other firm-level controls include firm size
measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage,
capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level.
Next, we show that our results are not driven by movements in exchange rates between
the RMB and other currencies. Since the RMB experienced a substantial appreciation in
late 2005, we exclude observations from the period of 2005-2006, and conduct robustness
checks based on the pre-appreciation period of 2000-2004. The results are reported in
columns 1-4 of Table 12. Again our main findings stay unchanged.
Lastly, one might be concerned about the role played by China’s SOEs.41 In general,
the Chinese government may give SOEs more favorable treatments than domestic private
firms. In addition, some SOEs may be employment- and/or size-oriented rather than
purely profit-oriented. Although the baseline regressions have already controlled for firm-
size effect, this ownership issue is never explicitly addressed and it could potentially affect
40Extending the range of outliers to top and bottom 5 percentage would not change our results either.
41Also, there are many foreign-invested companies and joint ventures in China.
37
SOEs’ behavior of markup adjustments. For this reason, we re-conduct our baseline
regressions for ordinary and processing trades with firm-ownership fixed effects (measured
by the firm’s registered type in China).42 These results are reported in columns 5-8 of
Table 12. Our main findings are robust to adding ownership variables.
Table 12: Robustness: Sensitivity to Exchange Rates and Firm Ownership Types
Dependent variable: Firm-product markup
Sensitivity to Exchange Rates Sensitivity to Firm Ownership Types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade Ordinary Trade Processing Trade
Input tariff -2.259* -2.368* -0.579 -0.554 -2.859** -2.446** 0.156 0.538
(1.266) (1.222) (1.278) (1.207) (1.223) (1.177) (2.018) (1.819)
Output tariff 1.038 1.072 0.553 0.585 0.862 0.736 -1.749 -1.506
(1.034) (1.006) (0.871) (0.864) (0.867) (0.845) (2.231) (1.989)
log(TFP) 0.902*** 0.864*** 0.918*** 0.950***
(0.083) (0.062) (0.050) (0.055)
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Ownership Type Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 306948 306948 106148 106148 575824 575824 168813 168813
R-squared 0.892 0.893 0.881 0.883 0.876 0.878 0.859 0.862
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-year
level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-2 and 5-6 use ordinary trade observations, and specifications 3-4 and 7-8 use
processing trade observations. Specifications 1-4 conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to exchange rate fluctuations,
whereas specifications 5-8 test the sensitivity of our results to different ownership types. Other firm-level controls include
firm size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average
wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level.
7 Conclusion
This paper uncovers patterns of markup adjustments under trade liberalization. The
implication strongly suggests that better accessibility to imported intermediate inputs
can substantially increase firms’ market powers. We first document stylized facts re-
garding the relationship between China’s trade liberalization and markup adjustments
by firms in two distinct trade regimes. We then devise an econometric model from a
simple analytical framework with variable markups and imported intermediates. After
estimating this model based on Chinese production and customs data during China’s
42Types of ownership are SOEs, multinational companies, joint ventures, domestic private firms, col-
lective enterprises, etc.
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WTO accession period, we find strong and robust evidence that ordinary trade firms,
who are subject to import tariffs, would significantly raise their product markups upon
input-tariff reductions, while processing trade firms, who are duty-free, do not have such
reactions. The underlying mechanisms are also investigated empirically, and it turns out
the marginal-cost and import-dependence channels play important roles in linking tariffs
and markups.
Our study contributes to (1) a vibrant literature that examines the impact of trade
reforms on the efficient allocation of resources among trading firms, (2) the literature
that links improved access to imported intermediate inputs to superior firm performance,
and (3) the literature that explores differences between the response of ordinary trade
firms versus the response of processing trade firms to trade policy changes. It would be
interesting to further assess resource reallocation and markup adjustment under trade
liberalization across core versus peripheral products within multi-product firms. It would
also be fruitful to adopt a structural estimation that combines markup and quality adjust-
ments in a dynamic setup of firm behaviors. Last but not least, since Edmond, Midrigan
and Xu (2015) argue the distribution of markups to be an important determinant of
social welfare, another promising field for future research to explore is the distributional
outcome of markup adjustments.
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Clare. 2015. “The Elusive Pro-Competitive Effects of Trade.”
Bas, Maria. 2012. “Input-trade liberalization and firm export decisions: Evidence from
Argentina.” Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 481–493.
Bas, Maria, and Vanessa Strauss-Kahn. 2015. “Input-trade liberalization, export
prices and quality upgrading.” Journal of International Economics, 95(2): 250–262.
Bernard, Andrew B., Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott. 2010. “Multiple-
Product Firms and Product Switching.” American Economic Review, 100(1): 70–97.
Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, and Yifan Zhang. 2012. “Creative
Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-level Productivity Growth in Chinese Man-
ufacturing.” Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 339–351.
Broda, Christian, and David E. Weinstein. 2006. “Globalization and the Gains
From Variety.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2): 541–585.
Cai, Hongbin, and Qiao Liu. 2009. “Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:
Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms.” Economic Journal, 119(537): 764–795.
Chen, Natalie, Jean Imbs, and Andrew Scott. 2009. “The dynamics of trade and
competition.” Journal of International Economics, 77(1): 50–62.
De Loecker, Jan, and Frederic Warzynski. 2012. “Markups and Firm-Level Export
Status.” American Economic Review, 102(6): 2437–71.
40
De Loecker, Jan, and Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg. 2014. “Firm Performance in
a Global Market.” Annual Review of Economics, 6(1): 201–227.
De Loecker, Jan, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Amit K. Khandelwal, and Nina Pavc-
nik. 2016. “Prices, Markups and Trade Reform.” Econometrica, 84(2): 445–510.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum. 2002. “Technology, geography, and trade.”
Econometrica, 70(5): 1741–1779.
Edmond, Chris, Virgiliu Midrigan, and Daniel Yi Xu. 2015. “Competition,
Markups, and the Gains from International Trade.” American Economic Review,
105(10): 3183–3221.
Fan, Haichao, Edwin L.-C. Lai, and Yao Amber Li. 2015. “Credit Constraints,
Quality, and Export Prices: Theory and Evidence from China.” Journal of Comparative
Economics, 43(2): 390–416.
Fan, Haichao, Yao Amber Li, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2015. “Trade Liberalization,
Quality, and Export Prices.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(5): 1033–1051.
Fan, Haichao, Yao Amber Li, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2016. “On the Relationship
Between Quality and Productivity: Evidence from China’s Accession to the WTO.”
Working Paper.
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, Amit Kumar Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik, and
Petia Topalova. 2010. “Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth:
Evidence from India.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4): 1727–1767.
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, and Nina Pavcnik. 2005. “Trade, wages, and the
political economy of trade protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms.”
Journal of International Economics, 66(1): 75–105.
Gopinath, Gita, and Brent Neiman. 2014. “Trade Adjustment and Productivity in
Large Crises.” American Economic Review, 104(3): 793–831.
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Appendix
A Derivations of Equation 13
This Appendix is dedicated to derive the markup formula (13). Consider the following
production function for firm f in producing a product h at time t:
Qfht = Ft(Xfht) exp(ϕft) (A.1)
where Qfht is physical output and Xfht is a vector of inputs. Recall the production
function (2), this vector of inputs includes capital, labor and intermediate inputs. There
are two assumptions made about productivity. First, productivity ϕ enters in log-additive
form and is Hicks-neutral. Second, we assume that productivity is firm-specific. The
second assumption follows a tradition in the trade literature that combines firm-specific
productivity with firm-product-specific demand shocks (e.g., see Bernard, Redding and
Schott, 2010).
Producers minimize their production costs. Let Vfht denote the vector of variable
inputs used to produce a product h. These inputs could be freely adjusted at any point
in time. Moreover, we use the vector Kfht to denote dynamic inputs of production, which
are any input that is subject to adjustment costs, for instance, capital. We consider the
firm’s cost function to be conditional on the set of dynamic inputs Kfht. The associated
Lagrangian function can be written as:











+ λfht [Qfht −Qfht (Vfht, Kfht, ϕft)]
(A.2)
where P υfht and r
d
fht denote the firm’s input prices for the variable inputs v = 1, ..., V
and for the dynamic inputs d = 1, ..., D, respectively. The first order condition for any
variable input that is free of adjustment costs yields:
∂Lfht
∂Vfht
= P υfht − λfht
∂Qfht (·)
∂Vfht
where the marginal cost of production at a given level of output is λfht since ∂Lfht/∂Qfht =












The left-hand side of the above equation represents the elasticity of output with
respect to the variable input vector Vfht (the so called “output elasticity”). This approach
requires only one freely adjustable input into the production process. Define the markup
as µfht = ln(Pfht/λfht), where Pfht is the price for product h produced by firm f at
time t.43 As shown by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (2016),
the cost-minimization condition can be rearranged to obtain the following expression of








B Measure of revenue-based markup
In order to estimate firm-level markups, we use NBSC’s firm-level production survey
data, which provides information on labor employment lft. We use the sales revenue as
a measure of qft, the net value of fixed assets as a measure of kft and the total value of
intermediate materials as a measure of mft. To back out the physical quantity of qft, kft,
and mft, we deflate these values with sector-specific price indices provided by Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012).
We follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) in dealing with the unobserved produc-
tivity shocks ϕft in the production function, which are potentially correlated with input
choices. As in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the firm’s material demand depends on its
capital stock kft and productivity ϕft as well as other variables that could potentially
affect the firm’s choice of materials in vector zft:
mft = mt (kft, ϕft, zft) (B.4)
where zft include export status, input and output tariffs, 4-digit industry dummies,
and city dummies. By assuming equation (B.4) is monotonic in ϕft, we can invert this
function to proxy for productivity shocks:
ϕft = ht (kft,mft, zft) (B.5)
Then, by replacing the productivity shocks ϕft with equation (B.5), we can rewrite
43Here we define markups in logarithm. This reason is to be consistent with our previous model setup.
This treatment differs slightly from the definition of markups in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
44
the production function as:
qft = φ (lft, kft,mft, zft) + εft
After approximating the function with a third-order polynomial in all its elements with
the exception of industry dummies and region dummies, we add the industry dummies
and region dummies linearly, and this yields an estimate of predicted output φ̂ft by
getting rid of unanticipated shocks and/or the measurement error εft in the first stage.
In the second stage, we estimate the vector of coefficients β = (βl, βm, βk, βll, βmm, βkk, βlm, βlk, βmk)
by relying on the law of motion for productivity. More precisely, for any particular vector
β, we compute the corresponding productivity:
ϕft (β) = φ̂ft − βllft − βmmft − βkkft − βlll2ft − βmmm2ft
−βkkk2ft − βlmlftmft − βmkmftkft − βklkftlft










then we can recover the innovation to productivity given β, ξft(β), by regressing
ϕft(β) on its lags. Note that ξft is a function of the chosen vector β. Moreover, this
innovation term ξft (β), by definition, is independent of all lagged variables. In particular
we have a set of moment conditions: 44
E (ξftYft) = 0 (B.6)
where Yft contains lagged labor, current capital, lagged materials as well as lagged
input/output tariffs, lagged export status, and their appropriate interactions with inputs.
Equation (B.6) generates the moment conditions which allow us to estimate the vector








, where θ̂Mft is




ft is the value of total
input materials. The material output elasticity, θ̂Mft , can be estimated as:
θ̂Mft = β̂m + 2β̂mmmft + β̂lmlft + β̂mkkft
44Recall that, to estimate the firm-product markup, we need to solve numerically a system of equations
which requires extra information such as the sales of each product as well as the input allocation across
products.
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C Measure of quantity-based markup
We combine NBSC’s survey data with its physical-quantity dataset for the period 2000-
2006. This merged data set contains physical quantities of output, which can be used
as a measure of qft to estimate markups. However, capital kft and material mft inputs
are still only available in value terms. To back out physical quantities of kft and mft,
we still have deflate these values with sector-specific price indices provided by Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012). As a result, there exist a deviation of the unobserved
(log) firm-specific input price from the (log) industry-wide input price index. The true
estimation specification of equation now becomes:
qft = f (xft; β) +B (wft;xft; β) + ϕft + εft (C.7)
where xft denotes the (observed) vector of deflated inputs; wft denotes the deviation
of the unobserved (log) firm-specific input price from the (log) industry-wide input price
index. Hence, consistently estimating the above equation requires a proper control for the
unobserved firm productivity ϕft and the omitted firm-specific input price B (wft;xft; β).
To control for omitted firm-specific input prices, we follow De Loecker et al. (2016) and
Lu and Yu (2015) by assuming that firm-specific input prices ωft are a function of output
price (pft), market share (msft), and exporter status (eft), i.e., wft = wt (pft,msft, eft).
The merged dataset built on the survey data and the quantity-output data enables us
to calculate the output price pft. Now, Bft becomes B ((pft,msft, eft)× (1, xft) ; β; δ),
where δ corresponds to the parameters in wt (·). 45
As in Appendix B, we follow the method in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to proxy for
productivity shocks by equation (B.5):
ϕft = ht (kft,mft, zft)
where the vector zft include output price, market share, export status, input and
output tariffs, product dummies, and city dummies.
Plugging the expressions for the input price correction and for the unobserved pro-
ductivity into production function, we have:
qft = φt (xft,Zft) + εft
45In our benchmark specifications, we only used the firm-level production survey data. This data set
does not have physical quantities of output. Consequently, there is no information on output prices.
This means that, when the survey data is used, we could not control the deviation of the unobserved
(log) firm-specific input/output price from the (log) industry-wide input/output price index.
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As in Appendix B, we approximate the function with a third-order polynomial. This
yields an estimate of predicted output φ̂ft in the first stage.
In the second stage, we express productivity ϕft as a function of data and parameters:
ϕft (β) = φ̂ft − f (xft; β)−B ((pft,msft, eft)× (1, xft) ; β; δ)
To recover the parameter vectors β and δ in the second stage, we consider the following










We form moments based on the innovation in productivity shock ξft, which satisfies:
ξft = ϕft − E
(




The moments that are used to identify parameter vectors β and δ are:
E (ξftYft) = 0
where Yft contains lagged labor, current capital, lagged materials, as well as lag
output prices, lagged market shares, lagged input/output tariff, lagged export status,
and their appropriate interactions with inputs. After we have estimated the parameters
β and δ, we can recover input prices according to wft = wt (pft,msft, eft).
The quantity output dataset provides physical quantity information at the firm-
product level, but in this dataset products are defined more broadly than in the custom
data. In other words, one product in the quantity-based dataset corresponds to several
products at the HS 6-digit level. Therefore, although we consider single-product firms,
when we merged the production data with the customs data, we will have multi-product
firms.46 When we estimate the input cost share ρ̂fht and the output elasticity for mate-
rials θ̂Mfht, we also control for the estimated input prices as in De Loecker et al. (2016).








46Unfortunately, the quantity output dataset from NBSC does not provide information of sales value
at the firm-product level. As a result, we can not calculate firm-product markups based on the merged
data (built on NBSC’s survey data and quantity output data). The reason for this inability is that we
have no idea about the firm-product share of the input’s expenditure α.
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D Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: Average Markup of Chinese Firms by Sector
Sector (2-digit CIC industry code) Ordinary trade Processing trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products (13) 2.585 1.875 2.341 1.880 1.285 1.886 1.575 1.818 1.570 1.239
Foods (14) 2.519 1.647 2.154 1.782 1.331 1.945 1.588 1.798 1.580 1.266
Beverages (15) 4.566 1.942 2.932 1.854 1.397 2.450 1.534 1.635 1.565 1.314
Textile (17) 2.647 1.953 2.448 1.964 1.361 2.270 1.932 2.204 1.722 1.351
Wearing Apparel, Footware, and Caps (18) 1.939 0.677 1.816 1.672 1.294 1.774 0.634 1.638 1.560 1.256
Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products (19) 2.664 0.896 1.798 1.891 1.348 2.265 1.057 1.833 1.657 1.300
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, 3.684 2.205 2.127 2.426 1.404 3.023 2.118 2.147 1.935 1.382
Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products (20)
Furniture (21) 4.941 2.607 2.950 2.724 1.858 4.533 2.805 3.311 2.674 1.885
Paper and Paper Products (22) 4.766 2.132 2.207 2.792 1.410 3.486 1.995 2.223 2.061 1.401
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media (23) 3.857 3.138 3.012 2.216 1.505 1.878 2.610 2.130 1.536 1.497
Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activity (24) 5.040 2.490 3.122 2.561 1.637 3.947 2.419 2.808 2.401 1.732
Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel (25) 3.055 1.575 2.971 2.700 1.692 2.403 1.339 1.719 N/A 1.592
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products (26) 2.927 2.353 2.412 2.549 1.451 2.395 1.932 1.989 2.277 1.465
Medicines (27) 4.044 2.673 2.628 2.518 1.402 2.716 3.106 1.959 2.326 1.387
Chemical Fibers (28) 2.343 1.222 1.976 1.659 1.387 2.312 1.536 1.981 1.519 1.384
Rubber (29) 3.793 2.533 2.711 2.396 1.378 3.026 2.412 2.437 2.145 1.374
Plastics (30) 2.430 2.656 3.194 1.725 1.458 2.225 2.567 2.691 1.661 1.478
Non-metallic Mineral Products (31) 4.574 1.775 2.463 2.514 1.749 2.906 1.991 2.246 2.090 1.740
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals (32) 3.479 2.051 1.919 1.324 1.425 2.473 1.549 1.590 1.533 1.446
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals (33) 2.055 1.653 1.678 1.166 1.442 1.669 1.732 1.633 1.488 1.438
Metal Products (34) 3.998 1.963 2.216 2.530 1.517 2.928 1.822 1.977 2.136 1.507
General Purpose Machinery (35) 4.355 2.132 2.662 2.455 1.449 3.239 2.041 2.355 2.037 1.474
Special Purpose Machinery (36) 4.579 2.436 3.129 2.919 1.476 3.286 2.190 2.680 2.282 1.529
Transport Equipment (37) 3.347 2.097 3.196 2.022 1.470 2.716 2.000 2.534 1.817 1.457
Electrical Machinery and Equipment (39) 3.711 2.325 2.100 2.411 1.740 3.131 2.146 2.143 1.940 1.821
Communication Equipment, Computers and 7.060 2.732 3.600 3.348 1.753 3.521 2.112 2.972 2.109 1.845
Other Electronic Equipment (40)
Measuring Instruments and Machinery for 4.908 2.716 3.077 2.702 1.658 3.945 2.502 2.833 2.449 1.663
Cultural Activity and Office Work (41)
Artwork and Other Manufacturing (42) 2.600 1.993 2.020 1.824 1.540 2.399 2.043 2.102 1.797 1.549
Notes: This table displays the average firm-product markup by 2-digit CIC sector for the sample of ordinary trade firms and the
sample of processing trade firms during 2000-2006. Specifications 1-5 refer to ordinary trades, and specifications 6-10 refer to processing
trades. In columns 1 and 6 we report the average firm-product markup used in our benchmark; in other columns we report the average
firm-product markup used as robustness checks in section 5.3. In columns 2 and 7 we take advantage of our quantity-based dataset; in
columns 3 and 8 we alter the production function by allowing the triple interaction term of labor, materials, and capital; in columns 4
and 9 we limit our sample to include only pure exporters; in columns 5 and 10 we estimate the markup based on our own model that
requires only observable market shares and substitution elasticities. We trim observations with markup lower than the 5th percentile
or higher than the 95th percentile for each year.
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Table A.2: The Effect of Tariffs on Markups: Decomposition
Dependent variable: Firm-product-level θ Firm-product-level α
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary Trade Processing Trade Ordinary Trade Processing Trade
Input tariff -0.251*** -0.217** -0.037 0.102 2.561** 2.174* -0.205 -0.446
(0.096) (0.090) (0.142) (0.136) (1.185) (1.147) (1.944) (1.751)
Output tariff -0.034 -0.011 -0.080 -0.089 -0.936 -0.769 1.607 1.366
(0.073) (0.075) (0.122) (0.119) (0.848) (0.821) (2.126) (1.890)
log(TFP) 0.001 0.012 -0.942*** -0.936***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.062) (0.054)
Other Firm-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575824 575824 168813 168813 575836 575836 168813 168813
R-squared 0.974 0.975 0.938 0.942 0.873 0.874 0.856 0.858
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at
the industry-year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-2 and 5-6 use ordinary trade observations, and
specifications 3-4 and 7-8 use processing trade observations. Specifications 1-4 adopt firm-product-level markups
with export quantity projection, and specifications 5-8 adopt firm-level markups. Other firm-level controls
include firm size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include
industry average wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-
digit CIC industry level.
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Table A.3: The Effect of Tariffs on Alternative Markups by Import Dependence
Dependent variable: Firm-product markup
unweighted ordinary weighted ordinary unweighted processing weighted processing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Input tariff -3.548* -4.317** -5.520** -7.289*** -1.076 -4.673 -3.059 -5.080
(2.085) (1.946) (2.524) (2.236) (8.872) (3.382) (10.801) (3.351)
Output tariff 1.138 1.337 2.347 2.836* 1.508 1.282 1.279 0.917
(1.293) (1.307) (1.549) (1.561) (1.856) (1.872) (2.168) (2.256)
Input tariff × Importing firm -1.527* -2.407** -2.104 -0.904
(0.818) (0.983) (7.373) (9.130)
Importing firm 0.204** 0.311*** 0.319 0.360
(0.089) (0.105) (0.719) (0.924)
Input tariff × Import share -6.024** -6.133** 5.027** 4.129**
(3.016) (2.567) (2.423) (1.986)
Import share 0.715* 0.660** -0.326 -0.193
(0.390) (0.309) (0.280) (0.230)
log(TFP) 0.205** 0.203** 0.103 0.104 0.039 0.032 0.041 0.027
(0.102) (0.101) (0.107) (0.107) (0.123) (0.121) (0.066) (0.066)
Other Firm-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 170278 170278 170278 170278 56593 56593 56593 56593
r2 0.877 0.877 0.866 0.866 0.869 0.870 0.867 0.867
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-
year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trades, and specifications 5-8 refer to processing trades.
In columns 1-2 and 5-6 we run unweighted regressions, and in columns 3-4 and 7-8 we run regression weighted by the
number of observations in the 2-digit CIC industry. Other firm-level controls include firm size measured by employment,
capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage, capital intensity, share of
college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level. The results stay unchanged when
we exclude firm-level and industry-level controls.
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Table A.4: The Effect of Tariffs on Alternative Markups by Marginal Costs
Dependent variable: Firm-product marginal costs (1-2 and 5-6); Firm-product markups (3-4 and 7-8)
Sample of Ordinary Trade Sample of Processing Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
marginal cost markup marginal cost markup
Input tariff 4.096** 4.226** -0.636 -0.616 2.657 2.747 -0.561 -0.517
(1.935) (1.915) (0.792) (0.783) (3.149) (3.204) (0.640) (0.644)
Output tariff -1.543 -1.251 -0.020 -0.058 -1.066 -0.901 0.777* 0.639
(1.261) (1.351) (0.423) (0.451) (1.725) (1.861) (0.433) (0.398)
marginal cost -0.984*** -0.984*** -0.981*** -0.981***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
log(TFP) -0.207** 0.002 -0.051 -0.011
(0.100) (0.012) (0.123) (0.011)
Other Firm-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 170278 170278 170278 170278 56593 56593 56593 56593
R-squared 0.887 0.887 0.985 0.985 0.900 0.900 0.991 0.991
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors corrected by clustering variables at the industry-
year level are in parentheses. Specifications 1-4 refer to ordinary trades, and specifications 5-8 refer to processing
trades. In columns 1-2 and 5-6 the dependent variables are firm-product level marginal costs; in columns 3-4 and
7-8 the dependent variables are firm-product level markups. Other firm-level controls include firm size measured
by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average wage, capital
intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level.
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Table A.5: Model-Based Markup Measures
Dependent variable: Firm-product markup
Alternative Market Share σ = 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ordinary trade Processing trade Ordinary trade Processing trade
Input tariff -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.043 -0.041
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.026) (0.056) (0.057)
Output tariff 0.005** 0.005** 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 -0.030 -0.037
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.035) (0.035)
log(TFP) -0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Other Firm-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Industry-level Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm-Product Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 575836 575836 168795 168795 575441 575441 167995 167995
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.997 0.707 0.707 0.722 0.722
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In Specifications 1-4 we compute market shares within the HS 2-digit
industry classification instead of the HS 4-digit industry classification as in the main text. In specifications 5-8 we
apply the same elasticity of substitution across different industries, i.e. σ = 6. Other firm-level controls include firm
size measured by employment, capital-labor ratio, and average wage; industry-level controls include industry average
wage, capital intensity, share of college-trained employees, and the Herfindahl index at the 4-digit CIC industry level.
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